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The Motivation Requirement in Single Employee
Discharge Cases
INTRODUCTION
Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act' makes it an
unfair labor practice for an employer to encourage or discourage
union membership by discriminating against employees.2 However,
the statute does not specify the degree of discriminatory intent
which must be shown in order to find a violation. In 1937, in its
first decision dealing with the Act, the Supreme Court recognized
that the employer's "true purpose is the subject of investigation",,
in a discriminatory discharge case. Over forty years later, the de-
gree of antiunion motivation needed to find a section 8(a)(3) viola-
tion is still at issue in cases where a single employee, or a very
small number of employees, is discharged, and it is alleged that the
discharge was discriminatory. The employer often claims that the
discharge was founded on reasons unassociated with the em-
ployee's union activity-for instance, for absenteeism or some vio-
lation of work rules.
If the employer's action was not taken because of union activity,
it is not unlawful. Where there is evidence of both proper and im-
proper reasons, the test used to determine the motive will deter-
mine the outcome of the case. Because the major portion of unfair
labor practice charges filed against employers allege discrimination
or illegal discharges,4 a clear statement of the principles to be ap-
plied in such cases is of special significance.
Currently there is conflict among the courts of appeals concern-
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1970).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970). Under the NLRB's administrative regulations, any per-
son may file a charge alleging an unfair labor practice. The regional office of the NLRB
decides whether to issue a complaint on a charge filed. If a complaint is issued, a hearing is
conducted before an administrative law judge, who prepares a recommended order. Excep-
tions to the recommended order are filed with the NLRB. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.1-102.51.
The NLRB's final orders are not self-enforcing. The NLRB can petition a court of appeals
for enforcement, 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1970); any party aggrieved by the order may petition
the court of appeals for review, 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1970).
3. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45-46 (1937).
4. In fiscal 1978, the percentage was 63%, or 17,125 of 27,056 charges. 43 NLRB Ann.
Rep. 9 (1978).
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ing the proper test to be applied in these cases.6 Some of the courts
apply a "but for" test, finding a violation only if the employee
would not have been discharged but for his union activity. An em-
ployer with mixed motives for firing an employee thus commits no
unfair labor practice as long as valid cause for the discharge exists
apart from any other motive. Other circuits, and the NLRB, use a
"partial motivation" test, holding that if the discharge is motivated
in any part by antiunion animus, section 8(a)(3) has been violated.
This note will analyze the theory and application of these tests
in the mixed-motive setting in order to determine which test is
most consistent with the motivation requirement and evidentiary
burdens established for section 8(a)(3) violations generally.
THE "BUT FOR" TEST
The "but for" test is best examined through the line of decisions
in the First Circuit which developed it. It is one interpretation of
the "true purpose" dicta in the Supreme Court's 1937 decision in
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.6 The First Circuit has ap-
plied this test consistently and forcefully to single employee
mixed-motive discharge cases.
Early First Circuit cases simply balanced the employer's proper
and improper motives to determine which one controlled. For ex-
ample, in NLRB v. Whitin Machine Works, the court held that a
discharge for a mixture of reasons would be discriminatory if an
employee's union activity weighed more heavily in the decision to
fire than did the employer's dissatisfaction with work perform-
ance.8 A similar conclusion was reached in NLRB v. Lowell Sun
Publishing Co.,' in which the court determined that legitimate
business reasons were the employer's "impelling motive."'" The
concurring opinion of Judge Aldrich, however, stated that although
the "true purpose" was the proper subject of investigation, the dis-
charge would violate section 8(a)(3) only if the improper motive
5. The courts of appeals are charged with reviewing the NLRB's orders on findings of
unfair labor practices. See note 2 supra.
6. 301 U.S. 1, 45-46 (1937). See text accompanying note 3 supra. In another landmark
case, Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132 (1937), the Court referred to the em-
ployer's "real motive" in discussing the section 8(a)(3) issue.
7. 204 F.2d 883 (1st Cir. 1953).
8. Id. at 883, 885.
9. 320 F.2d 835 (1st Cir. 1963).
10. Id. at 841.
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were the dominant one. 1 The First Circuit has applied the "domi-
nant motive" test as recently as 1976.2
Although the "dominant motive" test had previously been ap-
plied in a pure balancing fashion, it crystallized in a somewhat dif-
ferent form in the First Circuit's decision in NLRB v. Fibers Inter-
national Corp.'s The court there explained that by "dominant" it
meant the controlling or effective motive, but went on to remark in
a footnote that there would be a violation only if there would have
been no discharge in the absence of the employee's union activ-
ity.' 4 Having thus cast the test in "but for" terms, the First Circuit
continued to enforce its interpretation without any manifestation
of approval by the Supreme Court.' 6 When the Court handed down
its decision in Mt. Healthy Board of Education v. Doyle,'6 the
court of appeals quickly latched on to the analysis used therein.
In Mt. Healthy, the Board of Education decided not to rehire
Doyle, a high school teacher. In making that decision, the school
considered several instances of work-related misconduct and also
considered a phone call made by Doyle to a local radio station. In
that phone call, Doyle had related the substance of a memorandum
circulated to teachers dealing with a teacher dress code. A disc
jockey announced the dress code as a news item.17
Doyle claimed that he had a right to reinstatement because the
decision not to rehire him was based on his exercise of first amend-
ment freedoms.' 8 The Court agreed that the phone call was pro-
tected by the first amendment, but held that even if this activity
had played a substantial part in the school board's decision not to
rehire Doyle, he had no absolute right to reinstatement. Only if
Doyle would have been rehired in the absence of his exercise of
11. Judge Aldrich reasoned that this refinement was necessary because if general anti-
union animus alone would suffice to make a discharge discriminatory, "a militant union man
would feel that he could safely behave as he chose." Id. at 842 (concurring opinion of Al-
drich, J.).
12. See Stone & Webster Eng'r Corp. v. NLRB, 536 F.2d 461, 466-67 n. 8 (1st Cir. 1976)
("[A] discharge would be improper if the discriminatory motive predominates.") See also
NLRB v. Circle Bindery, Inc., 536 F.2d 447 (1st Cir. 1976); NLRB v. Gotham Indus. Inc.,
406 F.2d 1306 (1st Cir. 1969); NLRB v. Pioneer Plastics Corp., 379 F.2d 301 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 929 (1967).
13. 439 F.2d 1311 (1st Cir. 1971), reh. denied, 439 F.2d 1315 (1st Cir. 1971) (per curiam).
14. Id. at 1312 n. 1.
15. This despite the NLRB's repeated refusals to follow the "dominant motive" test. See
Judge Aldrich's remarks in Fibers International, 439 F.2d at 1312.
16. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
17. Id. at 282.
18. Id. at 283-84.
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protected liberties could he be ordered reinstated. If, because of
misconduct, Doyle would not have been rehired anyway, his exer-
cise of first amendment rights could not prevent the school board
from refusing to rehire him." In cases decided after Mt. Healthy,
the First Circuit held that the Supreme Court's rationale applied
by analogy" to discriminatory discharge cases under the NLRA,
and cited the decision as support for the "dominant motive" test,
phrased in "but for" terms.21
Formulations similar to the "but for" or "dominant motive" test
have been used in the Fourth,2 2 Fifth,23 and Ninth24 Circuits. Re-
19. Id. at 285-86. The Court remanded the case for a determination of whether the
school board would have decided not to rehire Doyle in the absence of any consideration of
his phone call to the radio station.
For an expansive interpretation of this decision as it relates to the discriminatory dis-
charge area, see DuRoss, Toward Rationality in Discriminatory Discharge Cases: The Im-
pact of Mt. Healthy Board of Education v. Doyle upon the NLRA, 66 Geo. L.J. 1109 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as The Impact of Mt. Healthy.]
20. The Mt. Healthy decision was, of course, outside the scope of the Act because it
involved a public sector employee. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(1) (1970). Doyle based his claim on
the first and fourteenth amendments.
21. See, e.g., Texas Instruments, Inc. v. NLRB, 599 F.2d 1067 (1st Cir. 1979); NLRB v.
Eastern Smelting & Refining Corp., 598 F.2d 666 (1st (*ir. 1979); Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v.
NLRB, 592 F.2d 595 (1st Cir. 1979); Hubbard Regional Hosp. v. NLRB, 579 F.2d 1251 (1st
Cir. 1978); NLRB v. Rich's of Plymouth, Inc., 578 F.2d 800 (1st Cir. 1978); NLRB v. South
Shore Hosp., 571 F.2d 677 (1st Cir. 1978); Coletti's Furniture, Inc. v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 1292
(1st Cir. 1977) (per curiam). In Coletti's Furniture, the court remarked that it was "mar-
rying [Mt. Healthy] to [its] previous cases." 550 F.2d at 1293.
The Supreme Court reaffirmed its decision in Mt. Healthy in Givhan v. Western Line
Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979).
22. See, e.g., NLRB v. Appletree Chevrolet, Inc., _F.2d__, 103 L.R.R.M. 2067 (4th Cir.
1979); Florida Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 601 F.2d 125 (4th Cir. 1979); American Mfg. Assoc.,
Inc. v. NLRB, 594 F.2d 30 (4th Cir. 1979); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 583 F.2d
1268 (4th Cir. 1978); NLRB v. Patrick Plaza Dodge, Inc., 522 F.2d 804 (4th Cir. 1975) (Al-
drich, J. sitting by designation).
In each of the cited cases, the Fourth Circuit denied enforcement of a NLRB order, find-
ing no § 8(a)(3) violation. In Neptune Water Meter Co. v. NLRB, 551 F.2d 568 (4th Cir.
1977), the court upheld a Board finding of a violation, using a "but for" analysis, where the
employer told the discharged employee that his union activity was the basis for its decision.
23. In Frosty Morn Meats, Inc. v. NLRB, 296 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1961), the Fifth Circuit
held that a discharge for insubordination was not a violation of § 8(a)(3) despite the em-
ployer's statements of intention to fire union organizers. The court stated that the discharge
would have been unlawful if in the absence of a discriminating motive the employee would
not have been fired. Although this standard is analytically identical to a "but for" approach,
subsequent Fifth Circuit decisions do not consistently follow this reasoning. Compare
NLRB v. Florida Steel Corp., 586 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1978); Federal-Mogul Corp. v. NLRB,
566 F.2d 1245 (5th Cir, 1978); Mueller Brass Co. v. NLRB, 544 F.2d 815 (5th Cir. 1977);
NLRB v. Whitfield Pickle Co., 374 F.2d 576 (5th Cir. 1967), with NLRB v. Aero Corp., 581
F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1978); NLRB v. Big Three Indus. Gas & Equip. Co., 579 F.2d 304 (5th
Cir. 1978); cert. denied, 440 U.S. 960 (1979). The court most recently held that "the burden
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cent decisions in the Second and Third Circuits indicate that those
courts are changing their approach, having formerly used the par-
tial motivation standard."'
The "Partial Motivation" Test
A clear statement of this formula appears in a Second Circuit
case decided in 1954: "If employees are discharged partly because
of their participation in a campaign to establish a union and partly
because of some neglect or delinquency, there is nonetheless a vio-
lation ... ."" At about the same time that the First Circuit was
putting the final touches on its "dominant motive" theory,27 the
Second Circuit reiterated that if a discharge was even partly moti-
vated by antiunion animus, it was discriminatory."
Unlike the "dominant motive" approach, the "partial motiva-
tion" test does not require that the antiunion reasons outweigh the
legitimate reasons. The existence of an improper reason will taint
the discharge,2 ' and a determination of good cause will not pre-
is on the [NLRB] to prove that anti-union animus was the motivating cause for the dis-
charge" (emphasis supplied). Syncro Corp. v. NLRB, 597 F.2d 922, 924 (5th Cir. 1979).
24. The Ninth Circuit cases use the term "moving cause," which is interchangeable with
a "but for" analysis. See, e.g., Stephenson v. NLRB, __F.2d , 103 L.R.R.M. 2238 (9th Cir.
1980); Polynesian Cultural Center, Inc. v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 467, 473-74 (9th Cir. 1978);
Western Exterminator Co. v. NLRB, 565 F.2d 1114 (9th Cir. 1977) (citing Mt. Healthy);
NLRB v. Ayer Lar Sanitarium, 436 F.2d 45 (9th Cir. 1970). But see NLRB v. Central Press,
527 F.2d 1156 (9th Cir. 1975) (partial motivation test applied). The court in Central Press
apparently relied on a portion of the Ayer Lar opinion, but not its holding.
25. The Second Circuit adopted the "but for" approach in Waterbury Community An-
tenna, Inc. v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1978) (citing Mt. Healthy). The Second Circuit
previously used the "partial motivation" test. See, e.g., NLRB v. George J. Roberts & Sons,
Inc., 451 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Gladding Keystone Corp., 435 F.2d 129 (2d Cir.
1970); J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 380 F.2d 292 (2d Cir. 1967); NLRB v. D'Armigene, Inc.,
353 F.2d 406 (2d Cir. 1965), and notes 26 and 28 infra and accompanying text.
The most recent opinions in the Third Circuit use a "but for" analysis. See Stein Seal Co.
v. NLRB, 605 F.2d 703 (3d Cir. 1979); Edgewood Nursing Center, Inc. v. NLRB, 581 F.2d
363 (3d Cir. 1978). Edgewood Nursing cited, without overruling, NLRB v. Eagle Material
Handling, Inc., 558 F.2d 160 (3d Cir. 1977) (partial motivation).
26. NLRB v. Jamestown Sterling Corp., 211 F.2d 725, 726 (2d Cir. 1954). See also Wil-
liams Motor Co. v. NLRB, 128 F.2d 960, 964 (8th Cir. 1942) ("if a purpose ... was to get
rid of union men, it was to that extent a subterfuge to violate the Act" (emphasis added)).
27. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
28. NLRB v. Great Eastern Color Lithographic Corp., 309 F.2d 352, 355 (2d Cir. 1962).
29. The inference that must be drawn is one of causality-that is, the antiunion animus
must be linked to the discharge. Courts applying the partial motivation test occassionally
require that the discriminatory motive play a "material" part in the decision, see M.S.P.
Indus. Inc. v. NLRB, 568 F.2d 166 (10th Cir. 1977), but logically this is no more than a
requirement that antiunion sentiment be causally connected to the discharge, since an "im-
material" motive would have no legal significance.
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clude the finding of a violation. The "partial motivation" test has
gained wide acceptance and is currently applied in the Sixth, Sev-
enth, and Tenth Circuits. s0 The Circuit for the District of Colum-
bia probably still uses this approach."1
The issue of which test should apply in single employee mixed-
motive discharge cases has not been decided by the Supreme
Court. In the area of section 8(a)(3) violations generally, however,
the Court has defined the motivation requirement and provided
special standards of proof in a line of cases culminating in NLRB
v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc.32
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MOTIVATION
REQUIREMENT IN SECTION 8(a)(3) CASES
Although section 8(a)(3) does not specify that intent is an ele-
ment of a violation, 3 the Court has interpreted the Act as calling
30. See, e.g., M.S.P. Indus. Inc. v. NLRB, 568 F.2d 166 (10th Cir. 1977); NLRB v. Mont-
gomery Ward & Co., 554 F.2d 996 (10th Cir. 1977); Betts Baking Co. v. NLRB, 380 F.2d 199
(10th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. West Side Carpet Cleaning Co., 329 F.2d 758 (6th Cir. 1964).
A recent Seventh Circuit opinion appeared to be leaning towards the "but for" test, see
NLRB v. Campbell "66" Express, Inc., 609 F.2d 312 (7th Cir. 1979), but in a later decision
the court specifically stated that the Seventh Circuit has never endorsed "but for." Chicago
Magnesium Castings Co. v. NLRB, 612 F.2d 1028, 1034 (7th Cir. 1980). The "partial motiva-
tion" test had consistently been applied in cases prior to Campbell "66". See, e.g., Electri-
Flex Co. v. NLRB, 570 F.2d 1327 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 911 (1978); NLRB v.
Townhouse T.V. & Appliances, Inc., 531 F.2d 826 (7th Cir. 1976); NLRB v. Fairview Hosp.,
443 F.2d 1217 (7th Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Symons Mfg. Co., 328 F.2d 835 (7th Cir. 1964).
In Nacker Packing Co. v. NLRB, __F.2d_, 103 L.R.R.M. 2634, 2639 (7th Cir. 1980), the
court clearly reiterated that the partial motivation test is the applicable standard.
31. The Circuit for the District of Columbia uses a partial motivation rationale; see, e.g.,
Allen v. NLRB, 561 F.2d 976, 982 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (antiunion animus was "at least part" of
the motivation; finding of violation upheld); Ridgely Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 510 F.2d 185 (D.C.
Cir. 1975); Teamsters Local 152 v. NLRB, 343 F.2d 307 (D.C. Cir. 1965). But see Amalga-
mated Clothing Workers v. NLRB, 564 F.2d 434 (D.C. Cir. 1977), in which the court used a
"but for" analysis in upholding a NLRB finding of a violation.
The most recent Eighth Circuit decision seems to fall more closely within the partial mo-
tivation category. See Berbiglia, Inc. v. NLRB, 602 F.2d 839 (8th Cir. 1979) (valid grounds
no defense unless discharge solely for those gounds). In R.J. Lallier Trucking v. NLRB, 558
F.2d 1322 (8th Cir. 1977), the court upheld a finding of discrimination without clearly artic-
ulating the applicable standard. Earlier panel decisions are not easily classified. See Singer
Co. v. NLRB, 429 F.2d 172 (8th Cir. 1970), applying a clear partial motivation test; but see
Mead & Mount Construction Co. v. NLRB, 411 F.2d 1154 (8th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. Arkan-
sas Grain Corp., 392 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1968) (union activity cannot protect employee from
discharge for cause).
32. 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
33. Section 8(a)(3) provides in pertinent part: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer ... by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization
. . ." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970).
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for deference to the employer's discretion in the absence of unlaw-
ful motivation. 4 In Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB 5 the Court
recognized the relevance of motivation" but held that specific evi-
dence thereof is not "an indispensable element of proof of violation
of § 8(a)(3). 37 Specific proof of intent is unnecessary, the Court
reasoned, where employer conduct inherently encourages or dis-
courages union activity.8
In NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp."9 the Court took a further step
and held that intent could be inferred from "the inherently dis-
criminatory or destructive nature of the conduct itself."'40 In NLRB
v. Brown,4 however, the Court recognized that the employer's le-
gitimate business purposes must be considered in determining in-
tent. The case involved a union which had bargained with a mul-
tiemployer group. After a deadlock in contract negotiations with
one employer in the group, the union struck that employer. The
struck employer continued to operate using supervisors and tern-
34. "The Act does not interfere with the normal exercise of the right of the employer to
select its employees or to discharge them." NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S.
1, 45 (1937).
The 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments revised § 10(c) of the Act to provide that an em-
ployee discharged for cause cannot be ordered reinstated. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970). Senator
Taft explained that the Jones & Laughlin Steel rule had not been changed, and referred to
"cause" in a context unmistakably synonymous with employee misconduct. 93 Cong. Rec.
6678 (1947), reprinted in II NLRB, Legislative History of the Labor Management Relations
Act, 1947, at 1595 (1948).
For a view that the amended § 10(c) supports the rationale of the "but for" test as ap-
plied to § 8(a)(3), see The Impact of Mt. Healthy, supra note 19 at 1122-25. See generally
Christensen and Svanoe, Motive and Intent in the Commission of Unfair Labor Practices:
The Supreme Court and the Fictive Formality, 77 Yale L.J. 1269, 1280 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as The Fictive Formality].
35. 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
36. Id. at 43.
37. Id. at 44. See The Fictive Formality, supra note 34 at 1286-91 (since the Court
treated motivation as a matter of proof, the motivation requirement was not expressly
approved).
38. 347 U.S. at 45. "[This rule] is but an application of the common law rule that a man
is held to intend the foreseeable consequences of his conduct . Id.
39. 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
40. Id. at 228. The employer had effectively broken a strike by offering superseniority to
strike replacements and strikers who returned to work. This conduct was held to be "inher-
ently destructive" of the employees' statutory rights to self-organization. See note 42 infra.
See generally Teamsters Local 357 v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961); NLRB v. Truck Drivers
Local 449, 353 U.S. 87 (1957); Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945);
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941); NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph
Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938); Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 1 N.L.R.B. 1 (1935), enforce-
ment denied in part, 91 F.2d 178 (3d Cir. 1937), rev'd, 303 U.S. 261 (1938).
41. 380 U.S. 278 (1965).
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porary replacements. In order to exert economic pressure on the
striking union, the other employers in the group locked out their
employees and continued to operate, also employing temporary
replacements. The nonstruck employers informed their regular em-
ployees that they would be recalled when the strike ended. After
the strike was settled, all regular employees were reinstated. The
NLRB found that the use of replacements during the lockout by
nonstruck employers was a violation of sections 8(a)(1)4 ' and
8(a)(3). The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that where the em-
ployer's conduct is reasonably adapted to achieve legitimate busi-
ness ends or to deal with business exigencies, and the tendency of
the conduct to discourage union membership is comparatively
slight, the employer's improper motivation cannot be inferred but
must be established by independent evidence.4 3
The Court's final distillation of the doctrine of these decisions
came in NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc.4 The case involved an
employer's refusal to pay accrued vacation benefits to striking em-
ployees. In upholding the NLRB's finding of a section 8(a)(3) vio-
lation, the Court devised a two-tiered test for dealing with the mo-
tivation problem.
The first tier analysis is used if the employer's discriminatory
conduct is "inherently destructive" of employee rights. If the em-
ployer comes forward with evidence of legitimate business justifica-
tions, the NLRB must balance these against the interference with
employee rights. The NLRB can infer antiunion animus and find a
violation without proof of unlawful motivation. If the employer
does not come forward with business justifications, the NLRB
must find a violation.
The second tier analysis is used if the discriminatory conduct
has a "comparatively slight" effect on employee rights. If the em-
42. Section 8(a)(1) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7." 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(1) (1970). A similar prohibition applies to unions, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2). The rights
guaranteed in section 7 are the rights "to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of [the employees'] own choos-
ing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970). Employees also have the right
to refrain from any or all of such activities. Id.
43. 380 U.S. at 287-88. Since neither the NLRB nor the union had asserted that any
improper antiunion motivation existed, no violation of § 8(a)(3) could be found. Id. at 289.
See also Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965) and American Ship
Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965), both decided on the same day as Brown.
44. 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
[Vol, 11
Single Employee Discharge Cases
ployer comes forward with substantial business reasons, an anti-
union motivation must be proved to find a violation. If the em-
ployer does not offer evidence of a substantial business reason, the
NLRB must find a violation. Using either tier, the burden is on the
employer once discriminatory conduct which has some adverse ef-
fect on employee rights has been proved.45
APPLICATION OF Great Dane TO SINGLE
EMPLOYEE, MIXED-MOTIVE DISCHARGE CASES
One underlying problem with using the Great Dane approach in
single employee discharge cases relates to matters of proof. Al-
though an inference of antiunion animus can readily be drawn
from a mass discharge, establishing improper motivation becomes
more difficult when only one or a few employees are fired. In addi-
tion, an examination of the two-tiered approach as applied to
mixed-motive cases reveals that it is inadequate to settle the ques-
tion of which of two proven employer motivations will be legally
recognized.
As a threshold matter, in order for Great Dane to apply, the
employer's conduct need only "have adversely affected employee
rights to some extent."'4" Certainly, the firing of a union activist
could have some such adverse effect on other employees' union ac-
tivity.4 The initial determination then would become whether the
45. Id. at 33-34. See also NLRB v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 379 U.S. 21 (1964). See gener-
ally Janofsky, New Concepts in Interference and Discrimination Under the NLRA: The
Legacy of American Ship Building and Great Dane Trailers, 70 Colum. L. Rev. 81 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Janofsky]; Oberer, The Scienter Factor in Sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of
the Labor Act: Of Balancing, Hostile Motive, Dogs and Tails, 52 Cornell L.Q. 491 (1967);
Shieber, Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act: Part I. Discrimination, 29
La. L. Rev. 46 (1968); Shieber and Moore, Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations
Act: A Rationale-Part II Encouragement or Discouragement of Membership in any Labor
Organization and the Significance of Employer Motive, 33 La. L. Rev. 1 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as The Significance of Employer Motive]; Ward, "Discrimination" Under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, 48 Yale L.J. 1152 (1939); Comment, Employer Motive and
8(a)(3) Violations, 48 B.U.L. Rev. 142 (1968); Comment, Employer Discrimination Under
Section 8(a)(3), 5 Tol. L. Rev. 722 (1974); Comment, Proving an 8(a)(3) Violation: The
Changing Standard, 114 U. Pa. L. Rev. 866 (1966).
46. 388 U.S. at 34 (emphasis by the Court).
47. Contra, The Impact of Mt. Healthy, supra note 19, at 1118-19.. Nothing in the Great
Dane decision indicates that its holding does not apply to single employee discharge cases.
See Janofsky, supra note 45, at 96.
In Waterbury Community Antenna, Inc. v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 90, 97 (2d Cir. 1978), the
court held that "there is nothing inherently discriminatory or destructive about the dis-
charge of a single employee for cause, even if that employee is a union activist." (emphasis
added). This conclusion is not helpful in determining whether Great Dane should apply
1980] 509
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effect of the discharge was inherently destructive or comparatively
slight.48
If the discharge were found to be inherently destructive, the first
tier analysis would apply. Assuming that the employer produces
convincing evidence of a legitimate business justification for the
firing ("cause"), the NLRB would be required to balance the justi-
fication against the interference with employee rights. Presumably,
this balance has already been struck, because an employer is per-
mitted by the Act to discharge an employee for legitimate rea-
sons.49 However, because the first tier analysis also allows an infer-
ence of antiunion animus, the NLRB could find that the employer
had mixed motives.
If the effect of the discharge is comparatively slight, and again
assuming that the employer comes forward with a substantial busi-
ness reason, such as employee misconduct, antiunion animus must
be shown in order to find a second-tier violation. Once such anti-
union animus is established by independent evidence, the case is in
the same posture as the "inherently destructive" mixed-motive
case. Neither tier of the Great Dane analysis takes the next step
and decides which motive should be recognized as the legally con-
because it assumes an ultimate resolution of the motivation issue in the employer's favor.
Similarly, the court in Western Exterminator Co. v. NLRB, 565 F.2d 1114, 1117 n. 2 (9th
Cir. 1977) noted that the Great Dane analysis is inappropriate in single employee discharge
cases because proper employer action might thereby be penalized.
What these decisions actually point up is the tension created between the deference to
legitimate exercises of the employer's discretion and the protection afforded employees'
rights by the Act. See text accompanying note 59 infra.
48. Neither Great Dane nor NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailers Co., 389 U.S. 375 (1967), a case
applying the same test, provided any guidelines for determining which category applied to
the types of conduct alleged to be discriminatory. Since the employer had not come forward
with legitimate business reasons in either case, the conduct in each case was found to violate
§ 8(a)(3) regardless of which category applied. The lack of specific criteria for classification
of conduct as "inherently destructive" or "comparatively slight" is a significant problem.
See Janofsky, supra note 45, at 91-93; The Significance of Employer Motive, supra note 45,
at 13-16; Comment, Employer Discrimination Under Section 8(a)(3), 5 Tol. L. Rev. 722,
762 (1974).
It would appear that at least in the context of an organizational campaign in a very small
work force, the discharge of the chief union organizer would warrant an "inherently destruc-
tive" analysis. See NLRB v. Lantz, 607 F.2d 290, 299 (9th Cir. 1979) (discharge of two
employees inherently destructive); cf. NLRB v. Midwest Hanger Co., 474 F.2d 1155 (8th Cir.
1973) (large number of employees discharged). In Portland Willamette Co. v. NLRB, 534
F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1976), the court noted that an employee discharge could be "inherently
destructive" conduct. It is clear from context, however, that the court was referring to mass
layoffs.
49. See note 34 supra.
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trolling "real" motive.50 This is precisely the point on which the
"but for"-"partial motivation" issue turns. In choosing the proper
test, however, the principles established in Great Dane should not
be overlooked.
In this context, it should be noted that Great Dane did lay down
some fundamental precepts. The decision shows a definite ten-
dency to further the protection of employee rights. Justice Harlan,
in his dissent, was careful to point out that the holding created a
presumption in favor of the employee. This presumption, he wrote,
would give the NLRB new power to evaluate the employer's busi-
ness purposes."'
It is plain from the most basic application of the Great Dane
test that such a presumption exists. If the conduct fits into either
category, and the employer does not come forward with substantial
business justifications, there must be a finding of an unfair labor
practice. This will be the result even though the conduct has only a
comparatively slight effect on the exercise of employee rights and
no discriminatory motivation has been shown. The effect of this
presumption is to shift the burden of proving motivation to the
employer. Although the Great Dane test does not decide the issue
in mixed-motive cases, its presumption in favor of the employee
should be preserved if the purposes of the NLRA are to be
effectuated.
"BUT FOR" V. "PARTIAL MOTIVATION"
The Mt. Healthy decision,52 which applied a "but for" test in an
analogous employment situation, should not apply to mixed-mo-
tive discharge cases under the Act. The case can be distinguished
on the basis of the statutory presumption in favor of the employee
which provides the underlying rationale for the Great Dane deci-
sion. Such a presumption does not exist in the first amendment
area.
The Act was intended to cure the historical inequality of bar-
gaining power between employers and employees" and to guaran-
tee the rights of employees to engage in protected organizational
50. See note 6 supra. Of course, if the purported "legitimate reason" is pretextual, there
is no problem in finding a violation based on antiunion animus. In a mixed-motive case, by
definition, the employer will always be able to point to a legitimate reason.
51. 388 U.S. 38-39.
52. See text accompanying notes 16-21 supra.
53. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
19801
Loyola University Law Journal [Vol. 11
activities."' It is for this reason that the Supreme Court has read
into section 8(a)(3)'s prohibition of discrimination a presumption
in favor of employee rights.
The "but for" analysis destroys this presumption. By tipping the
balance back in favor of the employer, the test takes away the pro-
tection which the Act affords the employee55 by effectively creating
a presumption in favor of the employer. Under the First Circuit's
approach, if a legitimate reason for firing the employee exists apart
from any antiunion motivation, the discharge does not violate the
Act.56 Therefore, where an employer is found to have mixed mo-
tives for the discharge, he is presumed to have acted for a legiti-
mate reason.57 This analysis ignores the existence of antiunion ani-
mus if cause can be found for the discharge. 5s In so doing, it may
often fail to discern the employer's "true purpose."
The "partial motivation" test provides much more substantial
protection for employee rights. Since any antiunion motivation will
taint the discharge, the employer is required to act for reasons to-
tally unassociated with the employee's union activity. By preserv-
ing the presumption in favor of the employee, the "partial motiva-
tion" approach tips the balance in favor of the employee. The
54. See note 42 supra.
55. See Federal-Mogul Corp. v. NLRB, 566 F.2d 1245, 1263-65 (5th Cir. 1978) (concur-
ring opinion of Thornberry, J.), discussing the balancing of interests in the Mt. Healthy
case:
Similar competing interests exist in the labor setting, but there Congress has al-
ready established a balance by passing the labor laws. That balance favors the
employee, for Congress clearly recognized the superior bargaining position of the
employer. . . . The "but for" standard significantly restrikes this balance in favor
of the employer, and such a test is contrary to Congressional policy ....
Id. at 1265. But see Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61
Harv. L. Rev. 1, 22 (1947) ("but for" test should apply in § 8(a)(3) cases).
56. See cases cited in note 21 supra. See also The Impact of Mt. Healthy, supra note 19
at 1117 nn. 41-43, citing the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley amendments in support
of the employer's unfettered right to discharge. The cited sections are inconclusive as to
mixed-motive cases.
57. The burden then shifts to the NLRB to overcome this presumption by clearly show-
ing that the employer acted for an improper reason. "[T]he Board has the burden of estab-
lishing by substantial evidence an affirmative and persuasive reason why the employer re-
jected the good cause and chose the bad one." Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 592 F.2d 595,
602 (1st Cir. 1979).
Such a requirement impinges on the area of the NLRB's expertise. The NLRB's particu-
lar knowledge entitles it to make findings of fact as to employer motivation without having
to overcome an additional burden of proof imposed without legislative sanction. See note 64
infra, and accompanying text.
58. Federal-Mogul Corp. v. NLRB, 566 F.2d 1245, 1265 (5th Cir. 1978) (opinion of
Thornberry, J. concurring).
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balance, however, has been tipped too far.
Once the NLRB has proven that an unlawful motivation played
some part in the decision, the "partial motivation" test is satisfied
and legitimate reasons will not legitimize the discharge. By effec-
tively ignoring the employer's proper motives, this approach
presumes that the employer acted only for improper ones. Such a
test comes no closer to approximating the "real motive" than does
the "but for" test.
Actual Motive
Neither of these tests effectively deals with the tension which
exists between the employees' right to self-organization and the
employer's right to run his business. Normally, the employer has
the right to fire any employee for any reason. 9 Problems arise
when a prohibited motivation enters the picture. The Act, with its
strong policies favoring the protection of employees, then comes
into play. If there exists a complex set of motives, determining
which should be recognized as the "true purpose" is a delicate
task.
In light of the tension created by the existence of these two op-
posing and equally valid concerns, a balancing test is particularly
appropriate. The actual motivation can best be characterized as
the motive which weighs more heavily in the employer's decision to
discharge. If the antiunion motivation is the weightier one, the dis-
charge violates secion 8(a)(3). On the other hand, if proper reasons
weigh more heavily in the decision, the discharge is not an unfair
labor practice.60
This test is the one previously applied by the First Circuit. 1 The
difference between this formulation of the "dominant motive" test
and the "but for" approach is a fine but important distinction.6
59. "It is well accepted law that an employer may discharge an employee for any reason,
reasonable or unreasonable, so long as it is not for a reason prohibited by the Act." NLRB v.
Standard Coil Products Co., 224 F.2d 465 (1st Cir. 1955). It might be added that many
collective bargaining agreements prohibit discipline or discharge except for "cause." How-
ever, such limitations are imposed voluntarily through the bargaining process, not by
statute.
60. There is some support for a balancing test in the Supreme Court decisions. Great
Dane suggests such an approach, at least in its first tier analysis; the Court states that it is
the duty of the NLRB to "strike the proper balance ... in light of the Act and its policy."
388 U.S. at 33-34. See also NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 228-29 (1963) (pre-
ferring one motive to another is a weighing task).
61. See notes 7-11 supra.
62. The distinction is a matter of degree. While the balancing test makes the amount of
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Suppose that an employee has broken a shop rule which often, but
not always, leads to discharge. When the employer learns of the
violation, he goes to talk to the employee. The employer notices
that the employee is wearing a union sticker. The employer, who in
the past has made known his intense dislike for the union, says to
the employee "I told you about that union. You are fired."
If a "but for" test is applied, there will probably be no finding of
a violation. The focus of the inquiry will be on the existence of
cause. Since the employer had a good reason for discharging the
employee, he is presumed to have acted for that reason. His state-
ment is useful to the employee only if the NLRB can show that the
employer abandoned the proper reason and chose an improper
one.6 3 This is a difficult burden, and the NLRB is not likely to
carry it.
If a "partial motivation" test is used, there will probably be a
finding of a violation. The focus of the inquiry will be on the exis-
tence of an antiunion motivation. The NLRB will draw an infer-
ence of antiunion animus from the employer's known dislike for
the union and the statement he made to the employee. Because the
employer had an improper reason for firing the employee, he is
presumed to have acted for that reason. The employer can win
only if he shows that the discharge was motivated solely by proper
reasons. This, too, is a difficult burden, and the employer is not
likely to carry it.
If a balancing test is applied, the focus of the inquiry is to deter-
mine which motivation weighed more heavily in the decision to
discharge. Such a factual determination is no simple task, but it
remains the only way to recognize the actual motivation. The moti-
vation which weighs more heavily in the balance most closely fits
the description "true purpose." Here, too, the NLRB will draw an
inference of antiunion motivation from the surrounding circum-
stances. The presumption in favor of the employee permits such
inferences. The NLRB must then balance the inference along with
any independent evidence of improper motivation against the em-
ployer's evidence of good cause. The weightier motivation should
be given legal effect.
The balancing test is more likely to produce results which accu-
motivation determinative, under "but for" "[t]he magnitude of the impermissible ground is
immaterial . .. as long as it was the 'but for' cause of the discharge." Waterbury Commu-
nity Antenna, Inc. v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 90, 98 (2d Cir. 1978).
63. See note 57 supra.
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rately reflect the employer's intent. The employer cannot protest
that good cause existed if his actions were actually prompted by
unlawful considerations. On the other hand, the employee's union
activity will not immunize him from discharge. If the discharge was
motivated more by legitimate reasons than by antiunion animus,
there will be no violation despite some causal connection between
the improper reason and the firing. This balancing will adequately
reflect the legitimate tension created by the Act.
The NLRB is well equipped to apply such a balancing test. The
NLRB has the "special function of applying the general provisions
of the Act to the complexities of industrial life."'64 Its expertise en-
ables it to make a choice between "two fairly conflicting views,"' 5 a
task necessary to perform the delicate balancing required here.
Proof of Motivation
Once a legal standard is chosen for single employee mixed-mo-
tive discharge cases, the closely linked problem of proving the vari-
ous motivations must be considered. The NLRB can consider only
motivations which are supported by substantial evidence. 6
The real difficulty lies in determining what sort of evidence the
NLRB can use to support an inference of antiunion motivation.
Since employers rarely make overt statements showing such intent,
the NLRB must depend on circumstantial evidence. Under Great
Dane, if the discharge were inherently destructive, the NLRB
could draw an inference of antiunion motivation from the dis-
charge itself. Although it is possible that the firing of one employee
could warrant such treatment, the more common situation proba-
bly only involves conduct with a comparatively slight effect. The
NLRB would therefore be required to show motivation by inde-
pendent evidence. Because it is more difficult to draw an inference
from a single discharge than from a mass lay-off, the Great Dane
categorization should be avoided.
The lessons of the Great Dane line of cases should not be over-
looked, however. The NLRB has the power to draw important in-
ferences, and a special area of labor expertise has been granted. 7
64. NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236 (1963).
65. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951).
66. Id.
67. The NLRB may base its findings on the testimony of witnesses or its informed judg-
ment on matters within its special competence or both. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB,
340 U.S. 474, 490 (1951). See also Shattuck Denn Mining Corp. v. NLRB, 362 F.2d 466, 470
(9th Cir. 1966) (trier of fact may infer motive from the total circumstances).
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The NLRB should therefore be able to draw inferences from all
the facts and have its decisions reviewed in the limited fashion al-
lowed for under the Universal Camera68 decision.
A final problem in discharge cases is the proper allocation of the
burden of proof. Under the "but for" and "dominant motive" tests,
the shifting burden has been carefully spelled out.69 The NLRB
makes a prima facie showing of a discriminatory firing. The em-
ployer may counter by presenting evidence of good cause for the
discharge. The burden then shifts to the NLRB to find an affirma-
tive and persuasive reason why the employer rejected the good
cause and chose a bad one.70
Under the balancing approach suggested, this shifting burden
analysis can be largely circumvented. The NLRB would put forth
its case, and the employer would attempt to show that the firing
was based on legitimate reasons. There would then be no need for
the NLRB to attempt to show an affirmative reason why the em-
ployer acted for an improper motive. Since the establishment of
good cause does not explain away the existence of improper mo-
tive, there is no need to shift the burden back to the NLRB. Func-
tionally, each side need only put forward their best case with the
normal opportunity to rebut opposing evidence.
CONCLUSION
Resolving the current conflict over the standard to be applied in
single employee mixed-motive discharge cases will require careful
consideration of both the underlying policies served by the Act and
68. In Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951), the Supreme Court articu-
lated the standard of review by the courts of the NLRB's findings of fact, holding that the
reviewing courts must adhere to the "conventional judicial function." Id. at 490. A reviewing
court may not "displace the Board's choice between two fairly conflicting views, even though
the court would justifiably have made a different choice." Id. at 488.
For recent discharge cases illustrating the wide range of deference accorded by the courts
of appeals to the NLRB's findings, compare Electri-Flex Co. v. NLRB, 570 F.2d 1327 (7th
Cir.) cert. denied, 439 U.S. 911 (1978), with Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 592 F.2d 595,
604-06 (1st Cir. 1979). This variance may subside when the controlling legal standard is
clearly established. In NLRB v. Eastern Smelting & Refining Corp., 598 F.2d 666 (1st Cir.
1979), the First Circuit renewed its challenge to the NLRB to take the issue to the Supreme
Court. In an address to the ABA Section of Labor and Employment Law, former NLRB
General Counsel John S. Irving commented that "the Board's expertise does not entitle it to
ignore a Supreme Court decision as compelling as Mt. Healthy appears to be. If the Board
considers Mt. Healthy to be inapplicable, it must say so, and say why, or it will lose the
issue by default." Reprinted in 103 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 204, 208 (1980).
69. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 592 F.2d 595, 602 (1st Cir. 1979); NLRB v.
Fibers International Corp., 439 F.2d 1311, 1315 (1st Cir. 1971).
70. NLRB v. Billen Shoe Co., 397 F.2d 801, 803 (1st Cir. 1968).
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the practical problems of allocating the burden of proof in a com-
plaint case. The NLRB has thus far failed to obtain a decision on
these issues before the Supreme Court.
The motivation requirement should harmonize with the general
principles embodied in the statute and articulated in Great Dane.
A balancing approach is the favored means of dealing with the
competing interests of employers and employees under the law.
The employer's weightier or "dominant" motive for discharging an
employee should be given legal effect. Only inferences supported
by substantial evidence should enter into the balance, for the Act
is not a proscription against general antiunion sentiment. Finally,
the burden of proof should be allocated without placing upon the
NLRB a burden unwarranted by a sound interpretation of the
statute.
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